THE EQUITY OF A STATUTE.
A discussion of the phrase "Equity of a Statute" will not,
perhaps, lead to the solution of any burning question of the
day; in fact the principle involved in the phrase, as applied
in the seventeenth century, has been relegated to the limbo
of legal antiquities, reappearing now and then in altered
form, the ghost of itt former self. But no phrase in the
English law has been more indefinitely and loosely used
over a longer period of time, and a brief account of its place
in English legal literature may not be uninteresting; particularly since the general repudiation of the doctrine of
equitable interpretation or construction has not led to a surrender by the courts of the power, that must lie somewhere,
of applying to the literal meaning of the words of a statute
the principles of reason and common sense. Indeed some
of the more recent cases might confirm the view that the
power, broadly claimed but sparingly exercised at the common law, is to-day more freely exercised than ever by
courts that have disavowed the right to apply an equitable
construction to the statutes.
The word equity, as used in the phrase "Equity of a Statute," is not to be confused with the equitable jurisdiction of
the Court of Chancery. Historically the two meanings of
the word are of course related, but the term had a well-recognized meaning in the law courts long before it was applied to the doctrines of chancery. Equity, as a legal term,
was adopted into our law from civilian sources and brought
with it the various meanings that had been attached to it
by civilian commentators, most of which relate to the use of
a power, supposed to be possessed by the courts, of modifying the rigor of the law by applying to its interpretation
principles of an assumed ethical superiority.' Into this
Liebers' Hernienutics, Hammond's Note, p. 233; Spence's Equity,
Vol. I, p. 326, note (z846) ; Maine's Ancient Law, p. 27.
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maze it is inadvisable to penetrate except to note that the
2
word is defined by quotations from the continental writers
and is employed by the common lawyer in the same manner as by the canonist or civilian;3 all, in fact, that was
fluctuating and doubtful in the civilian use of the word
arquitas reappears in the use of that word by English writers, together, at a later date, with new sources of confusion
growing out of its application to a specialized system of
justice in a manner unknown to any other jurisprudence.
It is not, however, this general notion of equity but its
application to the exposition of statutes that is intended to
be discussed. That there existed a vague amd undefined
power, called tequitas, vested in the judiciary or executive, to
disregard the letter of the law to attain the ends of justice,
was an idea familiar to the civilians, 4 and clearly traceable
to the great master of ethics, Aristotle, whose words are
paraphrased in the familiar maxim "crquitas cst correctio
legis generatim late qua parte dcficit,"5 or as Blackstone
puts it, quoting from Grotius, equity is the "correction of
that wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is defiIt is true the maxim does not, in terms, discrimcient."
inate between common and statute law; the principle was
borrowed from a foreig source before it had come under
critical examination; but an inspection of the year book
'Bracton's definition (Chap. IV, 5, fol. 3a) is taken directly from
Azo in Inst. 1, 1. f. 24o). Bracton and the Roman Law, Gfiterbock
(Phila.. i866), p. So. See also Glanville, introduction.
Citations from the civilians, as well as from Thomas Aquinas
and St. Cyprian, are collected in the introduction to Ash's Epieikia or
Table to the Year Books.
' Puffendorf Elem. Jur. Univ. I, def. 13, § 22; Ash's Epicikia, supra;
Story's Equity, Chap. I.
' Equity is the correction of the law, when too general, in the part
in which it is defective. Plowden, 465, who adds, "or as the passage is
explained by Peronius, equity is a certain correction applied to law,
because on account of its general comprehension, without an exception
something is absent." If the original had been correctly stated the gloss
would have been unnecessary. Aristotle, Ethics, ad Nicom. lib. 5, c. io.
'it r6v Ittr[xotr Irap.6pOtwia ro'vyoto;, J 1elret, A& rb x v6Xou
Xal rpu. dvrl j
Bac. Abr. (1832). Vol. VII, p. 459.
C11l. Comm. Introd. 61, citing De crquitate, § 3. See Grotius De
Jur. et Pac. Lib. II, Ch. 16, § 26, 1; Seneca IV, Controversia 27.
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cases reveals the fact that it is in the domain of statute law
that the doctrine summarized in the maxim is applied; the
phrase "per l'cquite dc Ic stalut" is frequently on the tongue
of counsel and judge.'
St. Germain has an interesting chapter "In what manner a man shall be holpen by equity in the laws of England."" First, he says, "there be in many cases divers exceptions from the general grounds of the law of the realm
by other reasonable grounds of the same law, whereby a
man shall be holpen in the common law. * * * And
so it is likewise of divers statutes," and, after citing examples, adds, "And thus it appeareth that sometimes a man
may be excepted from the rigor of a maxim of the law by
another maxim of the law; and sometimes from the rigor
of a statute by the law of reason, and sometimes by the
intent of the makers of the statute." But in speaking of
the equity enforced by subpcena in chancery he says, "Of
this term equity, to the intent that is spoken of here, there
is no mention made in the law of England-but of an equity derived upon certain statutes mention is made many
times, and often in the law of England; but that equity is
all of another effect than this." Sir John Doderidge in
commenting on St. Germain is concerned lest some men
might think that the dialogues spoke only of the equity
which "enlargeth or restraineth statute law," and goes on
to explain that the use of equity "is triple in our law. For
i. Either it keepeth the common law in conformity by
means here mentioned. 2. Or it expoundeth the statute
law. 3. Or thirdly giveth remedy in the court of conscience
in cases of extremity, which, otherwise, by the laws are left
Equity, or epicikcia,10 as it is sometimes
unredressed."'
'3 Edw. IV, 14; 4 Edw. IV, 8; 15 Edw. IV, 20; 14 Hen. VII, T3;
14 Hen. VII, 17; Br. Abr. Tit. Parliament, § 1o4. The Year Book cases
on equitable construction of statutes are tabulated in Ash's Epieikia.
$Doctor and Student, Dialogue 1, Ch. XVI.
'Dodderige's English Lawyer, p. 211; Finch, 5; West's Symboleography II, p. 174; Dawson's Origio Legum.
"0&'xcLm%,reasonableness, fairness, equity.
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called, is therefore a recognized aid to the interpretation of
acts of Parliament in the courts of common law in the infancy of chancery jurisdiction, as the writers of that period
are at some pains to explain. 11
It is to Coke and Plowden that we are chiefly indebted
for an explanation of what was understood by the equity
of a statute in the period when the doctrine received its
greatest elaboration, a process peculiarly congenial to an
age influenced in its literary standards by Euphuism and in
its methods of reasoning by the ponderous rules of formal
logic, coupled with a belief in maxims as infallible major
premises for any argument. Says Coge:
"Equitie is a construction made by the Judges that cases out of the
letter of a statute yet being within the same mischief or cause of the
making of the same, shall be within the same- remedy that the statute
provideth; and the reason thereof is, for that the law-makers could
not possibly set down all cases in express terms.m

This, however, presents but one side of the subject, which
is explained more fully by Plowden in his note to Eyston v.
Studd.1 ' In that case a husband and wife seised in fee in
right of the wife levied a fine and the conusee granted the
land back to the husband and wife in special tail. After
having issue a son, the husband died and the wife, marrying again, levied a second fine to the use of herself and her
second husband, whereupon the son by the first marriage
n If space permitted it would be easy to point out instances in which
modern writers have confused these different uses of the word equity,
probably through the careless use of the wbrd, for the distinction is
too obvious to be disputed. See particularly Sedgwick on Statutes, p.
311 0874).
Co. Litt. Lib. I, Ch. II,§ 21, fol. 24b, quoting Bracton's definition.
See also 2 Co. Inst., 151; Porter's Case, i Co. Rep. 25; Corbet's Case,
i Co. Rep. 88; Chudleigh's Case, x Co. Rep. i31; Butler & Baker's Case,
3 Co. Rep. 27; Boyton's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 44; Vernon's Case, 4 Co. Rep.
4; Duke of Lenox Case, 2 Brownlow, 3o6.
" Plowd. 459. That Plowden was a specialist on this subject is evident from the frequency of the references to statutory construction in
his reports. Regnier v. Fogossa, Plowd. 9.xo, 17, i8; Plait v. The Sheriffs of London, Plowd. 36; Winibish v. Tailbois, Plowd. 46, 53, 57, 59;
Partridgev. Strange, Plowd. 82, 83; Fulinerstonv. Steward, Plowd. io9;
Buckley v. Rice Thomas, Plowd. 125; Hill v. Grange, Plowd. 177; Stradling v. Morgan, Plowd. 2o4; Wilion v. Berkley, Plowd. 244; Slowel v.
Lord Zouch, Plowd. 363, 366, 37I.
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brought ejectment for a forfeiture under the act of i i
Hen. VII, C.20. It was held by the whole court that there
was no forfeiture, for although within the letter of the act,
the case was not within the intention of the lawmakers,
which was to prevent women having jointures proceeding
originally from their husbands from disinheriting their
husband's heirs, and since in this case the land was
that of the wife herself, to bar her, after her husband's death, from disposing of her inheritance would
be contrary to all reason. "For oftentimes things which
are within the words of statutes are out of the purview of
them, which putview extends no further than the intent of
the makers of the act" As sound legal reasoning to day
as then.
"From this judgment and the cause of it," says Plowden," "the reader
may observe that it is not the words of the law but the internal sense
of it that makes the law 'and our law (like all others) consists of two
parts, viz., of body and soul, the letter of the. law is the body of the
law, and the sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law, quia
ratio ligis est anima legis.!'

It is. the fundamental principle of all interpretation that
words are to be taken in that sense which it is honestly believed the writer attached to them. And since interpretation never has been and never can be wholly dispensed with,
owing to the nature of our minds and language, since absolute language is conceivable in mathematics only, 15 gobd
faith and common sense are peculiarly requisite where the
object is to discover the true sense of a doubtful act. Literal interpretation is, in fact, rarely possible, since, as Lieber
points out, all human language is made up of tr6pes and
expressions relating to erroneous conceptions, such, for example, as "the sun rises," "time flies" or, in law, "convey"Plowd. 465. "As to construing the" statute by equity; equity is
synonimous to the meaning of the legislature" per Lord Mansfield in
R. v. Williams, x Wm.BL 93.
's Mathematical terms constitute an apparent rather than a real exception to the rule that all language requires interpretation; the mental
process by which such terms are represented to the consciousness is
as truly a process of interpretation as the construction of the most
difficult law.-Hammond's note to Lieber's Hermenutics, p. IS

THE EQUITY OF A STATUTE

ance of land," "bankruptcy" or "agreement." "If we understand by literal interpretation, a species which, by way of
adhering to the letter, substitutes a false sense for the true
one, it has no more meaning than the term false facts."
Plowden, however, goes on to elaborate his text; sometimes the sense is more contracted than the letter of the
law and sometimes more extensive, and equity operates in
two ways, by diminishing or enlarging the letter at discretion. For the first method he cites the passage from Aristotle previously referred to and adds numerous cases where
an exception had been made from the text of a statute:
"from whence the reader may observe how convenient a thing this
equity is. and the wise Judges of our law deserve great commendation
for having made use of it where the words of the law are rigorous, for
thereby they have softened the severity of the text, and have made the
law tolerable."

The other sort of equity is defined:
"Equilas est s'crborun lgis directio cificacius, rum una'res solumtnodo Iegis cavcatur z,crbi;, id omnis alia in tquali gcncre eisdem caveatur vcrbis. * * * So-that when the words of a statute enact one
thing, they enact all other things which are in the like degree"

And after citing illustrations he continues:

,

"And from hence it appears that there is a great diversity between
these two equities, for the one abridges the letter, the other enlarges
the one diminishes it, the other amplifies it, the one takes from the
it,
letter, the other adds to it. So that man ought not to rest upon the
letter only, nan: qui hacret in lilera, hacret in cortice, but he ought
to rely upon the sense, which is temperated and guided by equity, and
therein he reaps the fruit of the law, for as a nut consists of a shell
and a kernel, so every statute consists of the letter and the sense, and
as the kernel is the fruit of the nut. so the sense is the fruit of the
statute. And in order to form a right judgment when the letfer of a
statute is restrained and when enlarged by equity, it is a good way,
when you peruse a statute, to suppose that the law-maker is present,
and that you have asked him the question you want to know touching
the equity, then you must give yourself such an answer as you imagine
he would have done, if he had been present."
0

The length of this excerpt must be pardoned, as it presents the viewpoint of the ablest reporter of that time upon
one of the perennial )roblems of the law. Stripped of its
metaphor and circumlocution, it declares that the object to
be aimed at is the intention of the lawmaker, and that whlere
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this is in doubt the spirit and -reaso, of the statute controls
the letter, and upon this principle all of the cases cited by
Plowden might easily be decided, with the aid of the subsidiary rules of construction recognized by the courts. It
would be interesting, if space permitted, to take up these
illustrations seriatim and point out how a modern court
would approach the same problems. The same is true of
other cases decided in the period succeeding Plowden and
Coke. 16 Upon their facts, with some exceptions, it would
probably be agreed that they were correctly decided, but
the dicta indicate the' acceptance, in theory- at least, of a
principle that the courts. gadedbk the,dicttis of .-conscience
and natural justice, could. modify the. rigor of a statute or
apply its rules to cases not provided for, to avert hardship
or injustice. 17
"if you ask me then." it is said in Sheffield v. Ratcliffe," "by what
rule the Judges guided themselves in this diverse exposition of the selfsame word and sentence? I answer, it was by that liberty and authority
that Judges have over laws, especially over statute laws, according to
reason and best convenience, to mould them to the truest and best use."

Sir Christopher Hatton observes:
"Sometimes statutes are expounded by equities because law and
reason repugn to the open sense of the words and therefore they are
reformed to consonance of law and reason'

And Lord Chancellor Ellesmere in the case of the Postnati 20 went so far as to say:
"That words are taken and construed sometimes by extension; sometimes by restriction; sometimes by implication; sometimes a disjunctive
for a copulative; a copulative for a disjunctive; the present tense for
the future; the future for the present; sometimes by e4uity out of the
reach of the words, sometimes words taken in a contrary sense, sometimes figuratively, as contincns pro contento, and many other like; and
of all these, examples be infinite, as well in the civil as common law."
U Folliet v. Saunders, 2 Roll. 5oo; Jenkins, zoi, 288; Janies v: Tintney,
W. Jones, 421; Rogers v. Aascal, i Raymond, 128; Hammond v. Webb,
so Mod. 282. Dwarris on Statutes, Vol. II. p. 72o (83t).
ItBlack on Interpretation of Laws, p. 42.

Hobart, 346.
"Hatton's Treatise on Statutes, Ch. S, § 4, p. 44. See Hobbes"
Leviathan, Bk. II,Clh. 26, p. 14S.
'02 Howelrs State Trials, p. 675.
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which is almost equivalent to saying that statutes are to
be construed in a "Pickwickian sense."
\We must not, however, make too much of the rhetorical
flourishes of the age or smile too broadly at the a priori
methods of the sages of the law. If pragmatism is no longer
fashionable in jurisprudence it has strengthened its hold on
the sister science of metaphysics. The danger of the
method was averted by the caution of the courts and that
practical common sense which must be brought to bear in
every litigated case. If it is a crime to do X, and A does X,
he is guilty. But if A does X+Y what then? A modern court would say the intention of the legislature was to
punish for X although an additional circumstance such as
Y was present, therefore the act applies; a seventeenth century judge would have said: by the laws of logic X+Y is
not X; it is completely out of the letter of the statute, but
by equity, the statute is extended to cover X+Y, and A is
guilty by "equity of the statute." The result of the two
mental processes is the same, but the fallacy in the last
method lies in the assumption of the power to mould an
act to suit the courts' idea of wisdom or expediency."1 Such
a power the modern judge modestly disavows. "I think"
said Lord Tenterden, :there is always danger in giving
effect to what is called the equity of a statute, and that it
is much safer and better to rely on and abide by the plain
words, although the legislature might possibly have pro-'
vided for other cases had their attention been directed to
them."12 2 In America, the doctrine of equitable construction is regarded either as "long since exploded"2 3 or as
Itmust be remembered that it was then a mooted point whether the
courts had not power to set aside an act as contrary to reason. r Blackstone Comm. Introduc., p. 91; Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. ri~a;
Day v. Sav'idqe. Hobart. 87; London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 687; Wood v.
Walls, 2 El. & B. 458; Jones v. Smart, x Term. Rep. 44; Lee v. Bude R.
Co., L R. 6 C. P. 582; z Kent Comm. 447.
"Brandlitig v. Barrington, 6 Bar. & Cress, 467 at p. 475. See also
Guthrie v. Fisk, 3 Bar. & Cress. T78; Atty. Gets. v. GUllen, 2 H. & C. 431
at p. 532; Miller v. SaloVons, 7.Exch. 475 at p. 559; R. v. Turvey, 2 B.
& Aid. 520. Ex parte Walton, 17 Ch. D. 746.
" Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 272; Demarest v. IVY:nkoo', 3 Johns,
Ch. z42; Tompkins v. FirstNat. Bk., x8 N. Y. Supp. 234.
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approaching "so near the power of legislation, that a wise
judiciary will exercise it with reluctance and only in extraordinary cases ;"24 and where the phrase is occasionally met
J 25
with
it is safe to regard such use as a survival in language
rather than doctrine and not as intended to assert the power
to override the plain language of an act. 26 What is termed
the policy of the government with reference to any particular piece of legislation is a matter upon which opinions may
differ and is "a ground much too unstable upon which to
rest the judgment of the court in the interpretation of statutes."

2 7

The broad theory of equitable construction is so much at
variance with modern views as to the functions of the judiciary that apologetic reasons-have been suggested to account
for its acceptance. Lord Brougham states that the extreme
conciseness of the ancient statutes was the only ground for
the sort of legislative interpretation frequently put upon
their words28 and Lord Ellenborough has referred it to the
lack of precision in the drafting of acts that then prevailed.
And no douibt, as Lord Selbourne has observed, the province
of judge and legislator were not unfrequently confounded
under these principles. 2' It has also been suggested that the
ancient practice of having the statutes drawn up by the
judges from the petitions of the Commons and the answers
of the King would dispose the former to interpret with confidence,30 but Lord Halsbury has said that the worst person
"Monson v. Chester,

22

* Simonton v. Barrel,

21

Pick. 385.
Wend. 362; Hersha v. Brenneman, 6 S. & R.

Petit v. Fret:, 33 Pa. iiS; Hoguet v. Wallace, 28 N. J. L 523. In
Russell v. Meyrick (1903). Ch. 461. Cozzens-Hardy. M. R.. in construing
the estates act of 1863, quotes from Vernon's Case. 4 Co. Rep. ia and
adds. "it is frequent in our books that an act made of late time shall be
taken within the equity of an act made long before." See Hardcastle's
Statute Law (4th Ed.), p. wo.
2;

"United States v. JacksoX, T43 Fed. 783.
"Per Harlan, J., in Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sul:berger, 157 U. S.
T.at p. 37.

Gwyniwt v. Burnell, 6 Bingh. N. C 453, at P. 56r.
Wilson v. Knubley, 7 East. x34"; Bradlangh v. Clarke, 8 App. Ca.
354. at p. 363.
" Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes (4th Ed.), p. 386. Chief Jus-
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to construe a statute is he who drew it, for he is disposed
to confuse what he intended to do with the effect of the
language employed.3 1 It is unnecessary, however, to resort
to speculation to account for a doctrine thoroughly in accord with the philosophy of the law of the time when it
was announced and altogether out of harmony with that of
to-day.
But if the courts no longer avowedly enlarge or restrain
a statute, it is not to be denied that the same result is accomplished by the liberal application of principles in better
accord with the modern theory of the judicial functions.
Indeed it is more than doubtful whether the courts of the
seventeenth century would have construed the act of Congress of 1885, prohibiting the importation of aliens under
contracts to perform "labor or service of any kind," as not
applying to a contract of employment between a church and
an alien minister, for the reason that such employment was
not within the spirit and intention of the act, although within
its letter.3 2 In an act of Congress granting lands in a territory. to settlers, the words "single man" have been held to
include an aged widow ;SS and a widow whose husband had
long been dead and whose only child, a daughter, was living with her husband in another district, was held "an unmarried person not having a child" within a poor law. 3 1
The "suffragettes" have not fared as well as the widows;
in spite of a brilliant and persuasive argument by two of"
the appellants, the House of Lords has recently held that
women graduates of a university are not entitled to vote as
tice Hengham said that he knew better than counsel the meaning of
2nd Westminster, as he had drawn up that statute. 33 Edw. I (Rolls
Ed.), p. 82. Lord Nottingham claimed to know the meaning of the
Statute of Frauds, as he had introduced it into the House of Lords.
Ash v. Abdy, 3 Swanst. 664. See also Hay v. Lord Provost of Perth, 4

Macq. H. L Sc. 544.

nHilder v. Dexter (i9o2), App. Ca. 474.
'Holy Trinity Church v. United States, r43 U. S. 457. See Black
on Interpretation of Laws, p. 48. Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes,
Chapter XI, passim.
"Silver v. Ladd, 7 Wallace, 219.
' Turbett Twp. Overseers v. Port Royal Bor., 33 Pa. Super. Ct. S
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members of the university council, since the word "person"
in statutes conferring the franchise must be understood to
mean "male person."8 5 The word equitable as applied to
interpretation may. be tabooed, but the courts in dealing with
an act are just as capable as in the days of Plowden of
either extracting the kernel or leaving it in the nut.
W. H. Loyd.
Nairn v. University of St. Andrews (igoo), App. Ca. W4.

